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Abstract: The role of religion in Pakistani political and civil life has had a defining role
in the political development of the nation. The country is now a breeding ground for
religious extremism, with militant groups conducting brutal attacks against the Shia,
Ahmedi, Christian and Hindu communities of Pakistan. There have been few
explanations attempting to describe the problem of religious violence domestically,
within Pakistan’s borders towards Pakistani citizens. This essay examines how, despite
Pakistan’s initial conception as a secular state, the country has become haunted by intense
religious violence. It links the lack of consensus around national identity with the state’s
political exploitation of an exclusive and conservative version of Islam that laid the
foundation for the development of groups hostile to religious minorities, following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
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Introduction
Since the events of 9/11, the world has focused in on Pakistan, and its role as a
nation caught between its obligations to secularism and democracy while confronting the
problems of extremism and praetorian rule. Much of the discourse surrounding jihad1 in
Pakistan has been in relation to jihad’s effects on other nations and other peoples,
including Afghanistan, India, and the United States. However, a significant number of
Pakistanis are also victims of the violence that has come of the global jihad, and their
lives and livelihoods are arguably in greater danger because they are citizens of a state
that both actively and tacitly supports militant groups. These Pakistanis belong to
religious minorities in the country, and have been subject to persecution and
discrimination because of their peripheral religious status. The violence against them has
become so rampant that Minority Rights Group International, in its annual State of the

1

Jihad here is defined in accordance with mainstream Western understandings of the word, as a holy war
conducted by Muslim militant groups against infidels.
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World’s Minorities report for 2007 to 2010, placed Pakistan in the top 10 (out of a
ranking of 150 states) of its lists of states violating minority rights (MRGI 2010). There
have been few comprehensive analyses describing why religious minorities have and
continue be the victims of violence. This study links the lack of consensus around
national identity with the state’s political exploitation of an exclusive and conservative
version of Islam that laid the foundation for the development of groups hostile to
religious minorities, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
This paper argues that the problem of violence against religious minorities begins
with Pakistan’s initial lack of consensus around a national identity. Mohammad Ali
Jinnah and the Muslim League2, the founders of Pakistan, needed to create an ideological
basis for the formation of Pakistan. Many Indian Muslims were against a separate state
for Muslims. Jinnah, in order to mobilize broad support for a separate state, used the
rhetoric of secularism and democracy and relied on the symbols of Islam to invoke
support for Pakistan. What resulted was a vague understanding of Pakistan as an “Islamic
state” – it was not specified whose Islam would represent the state and its people. As a
result of this ambiguity, political and military leaders were able to use specific versions
of Islam to cement their power. General Zia Ul-Haq used a particularly strict and
conservative interpretation of Islam throughout his eleven years as head of state. It was
ultimately this version of Islam that pervaded the country’s legal and military institutions
and was also the version that left little room for the country’s religious minorities.
Through Zia’s codification of this particular Islam in law, it became the legitimate and
correct version, providing fodder for conservative religious clerics and pundits to fuel
2

The All-India Muslim League, popularly known as the Muslim League, was the North Indian Muslim
political party active from the 1910s to the 1940s that called for the establishment of a Muslim state
separate from India.
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their own agendas. There were few secular forces in the country strong enough to
counteract this pervasion of religiosity in public and political life. The influx of hardline
militant groups that rooted themselves in Pakistan following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the subsequent War on Terror found an environment that encouraged
and perpetuated fundamentalist agendas, especially ones that viewed “incorrect” versions
of Islam as blasphemous/heresy, and a threat to the existing order. These groups were
thus able to launch violence against religious minorities that remains unchecked.

Research Design
This paper seeks to explain why religious and sectarian attacks have taken hold of
Pakistan such that members of religious minorities feel unsafe when leaving their homes.
In order to accomplish this, I will establish that religious-based violence has indeed
increased in the country. I will do this by outlining a definition of religious violence:
targeted attacks against religious minorities because their faith is not that of the majority
group’s, which in this case is Sunni Islam. I will utilize sources of data from government
documents, human rights groups, and non-governmental organizations. The data obtained
from these sources will span the length of Pakistan’s history, from 1947-2013.
I believe that multiple explanations must be considered when attempting to
explain the problem of religious violence. These explanations include, (1) the initial
ambiguous national identity presented by the Muslim League that ultimately resulted in
the incorporation of conservative religious elements into state identity, which also
normalized a desecular understanding of statehood and citizenship; (2) the role of the
state in implementing religious intolerance into law and policy, thus providing militant
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groups with the political legitimacy to conduct violence on the basis of religion; and (3)
the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in spearheading the rise of global
Islamic fundamentalism. These explanations are the ones that appear most frequently in
the literature on Pakistan’s conservative religious environment, and I believe they are
most likely to explain the proliferation of violence that has wracked the country since the
1980s.
The first explanation is the affirmation of an exclusive religious identity by the
state, and thus the legal avowal of the inferior status of religious minorities. To fully
understand this theme, I will examine the historical trajectory of Pakistani political
development, with particular attention to the role of religion in law and policy. Thus, this
thesis will provide background information on Pakistani history, beginning with the
Muslim League’s call for a separate Muslim-majority state, and Pakistani leaders’ use of
religious rhetoric to mobilize mass support for a Muslim nation-state. This section will
rely mostly on secondary historical analyses of Pakistan from legal scholars and
historians.
The second explanation examines the presence of conservative interpretations of
Islamic law in state law, as a national policy pushed by dictator Zia Ul-Haq; much of this
section will be devoted to understanding how the Pakistani government’s incorporation
of church (or in this case, mosque) into state has allowed for and supported intolerance
against religious minorities. I will focus specifically on the 1980s as a period when state
legal codes were reformulated to incorporate aspects of conservative interpretations of
religious law. Understanding how the state has entwined its claim to legitimacy with
religious conservatism is central to explaining religious violence. The state’s sanctioning
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of intolerant institutionalizations of religion legitimizes the actions of extremist groups,
who are then able to justify their violence as part of their moral and religious obligation.
I will also examine the relationship of sectarian groups to the military. Using
secondary scholarly analysis, I will attempt to understand the official policies of the
military, the country’s most powerful institution, against religiously motivated extremists.
I will examine whether the military, following United States’ orders post-9/11, is actively
engaged in dismantling these groups, or if it turns a blind eye to their attacks and even
tacitly supports them. Responses by the military to religiously motivated attacks will be
analyzed as evidence for this final argument; for example, the military’s official
sanctioning of certain extremist groups will be cause to accept this, as well as its stream
of money to those organizations will also be examined.
The third explanation links the first two with the consequences of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in defining Pakistan’s political affairs. This explanation will be
examined through socio-historical processes, similar to the methodology that is employed
in understanding the first explanation. I will examine the role of the United States, Saudi
Arabia, and the Soviet Union in South/Central Asia’s politics, paying particular attention
to how their interests competed, diverted, and collaborated to create an environment of
religious intolerance in the region. Thus, I will examine how the Pakistani Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded the rise
of extremist groups. There has been significant literature written on this historical
trajectory, and I will be utilizing scholarly sources to further argue that the initial rise of
extremism would not have occurred were it not for the United States’, Pakistan’s and
Saudi Arabia’s sponsorship of religiously conservative militant groups.
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After examining the problem of religious violence under this broader, regional
umbrella, I will hone in on Pakistan’s version in particular. I will argue that the
proliferation of madrassas under Saudi Arabia’s patronage of exclusivist Islam has and
continues to support militant groups with sectarian ideals. These schools radicalize
vulnerable youth, instilling in them perceived obligations to fight against infidels both at
home and abroad. These religious schools have created an atmosphere of intolerance and
persecution that demeans the rights of religious minorities.
All of these factors will be examined in isolation when possible, and will also be
examined in tandem with one another. For example, the success of religiously militant
groups was at least in part fueled by the state’s strengthening of religious conservatism
during the 1980s, which implicitly categorized minorities as inferior ‘others’ in law and
public policy. Militant groups could thus make the claim that religious minorities are not
Muslims, and have no place in an explicitly Islamic state. The goal of this paper is to
ultimately provide an understanding of how these explanations culminated in the creation
of a religiously intolerant climate that accounts for the prevalence of violence against
religious minorities.

The Plight of Religious Minorities and Sects
A religious minority here is defined as any group numerically inferior to the rest
of the population of a state whose population possesses religious characteristics different
from the majority population. Minority religious groups together compose about 25% of
Pakistan’s population (Gregory 2012), and are listed in the table on the following page.
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Table 1.1 – Demographics of Pakistani Religious Groups (Gregory 2012)
Religious Group
Population in 2012
Shia Muslims
16. 5 million
Christians
3.5 million
Hindus
2-4 million
Zikri Muslims
> 700,000
Ahmedi Muslims
285,000
Sikhs
50,000
Baha’i Faith
30,000
Buddhists
20,000
Zoroastrians
5,000
Mehdi Foundation
< 5,000
Jews
< 100

There have been few explanations attempting to describe the problem of religious
violence domestically, within Pakistan’s borders towards Pakistani citizens. Since the
Soviet invasion of Afghan, militancy has greatly increased in Pakistan. According to the
1998 census, approximately 96 percent of the Pakistani population is Muslim
(International Crisis Group 2005). There is as yet no data on Muslim sects in the country
as the government prefers to posit an image of the population as religiously homogenous;
however, according to unofficial estimates, 75 to 80 percent of the Muslim population is
Sunni, and 15 to 20 percent is Shia. Other religious groups include Ahmedi Muslims,
Zikri Muslims, Bahai Muslims, Christians, and Hindus. Shias, Ahmedis, and Christians
in particular have long been the brunt of targeted attacks, killings, and both de jure and de
facto discrimination (ICG 2005).
While there are Shia religious parties that have engaged in jihad-based militancy,
over 70% of those killed in sectarian violence since 1985 have been Shia Muslims (Rana
2005). The number of Shia Muslims that have been killed since 2001 has now reached
4,159 (South Asian Terrorism Portal). The overwhelming majority of these have been the
result of bomb blasts in mosques, as well as specific, targeted murders of known
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members of Shia communities. Doctors and lawyers are specifically targeted (South
Asian Terrorism Portal), likely because they represent the intellectual core of the
community.
Ahmedi Muslims are also the subject of attacks and violence; their peripheral
status has also been codified in law. Pakistani law does not view Ahmedis as Muslims,
despite the sect’s own proclamation as Muslim. Not only does the state dismiss the
Ahmedis’ own definitions of their faith, but has proclaimed them second-class citizens by
deeming them non-Muslim. The Ahmedi Muslim community, much like the Shia
community, has endured harassment, persecution, and oppression since Pakistan’s
inception. Their mosques have been set on fire, their graves have been desecrated, and
they have been the subject of general violence and discrimination. Ahmedis have often
been charged for blasphemy for ‘pretending’ to be Muslim – i.e., they are not true
Muslims under the state’s definition, and violate its Islamic norms by claiming to be
Muslim. Ahmedis are therefore not even allowed to vocalize their religious idenitity
without fear of imprisonment (Khan 2012; Gregory 2012).
The Hindu community in Pakistan is also small, numbering approximately 1.2
percent of the total population. Hindus report intense harassment and discrimination; they
report having secret files placed on their affairs; prohibition from joining the armed
forces, the judiciary, or the civil service; and physical violence on their persons, as well
as attacks on their temples. Hindu temples are often set on fire in mob displays of anger,
and face general physical abuse when they step out into public (Gregory 2012).
The Christian community reports similar harassment. Militant groups including
the Taliban have attempted to forcibly convert Christian communities through threats and
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violence; there is also evidence that the Taliban have forced Christians in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas to pay Islamic taxes. The Pakistani Taliban in particular has
targeted Christians within the past several years. Christian churches have been sprayed
with pro-Taliban graffiti. Through 2010-2011, Taliban militants active in Karachi
targeted known Christians in violent attacks, killing at least eight and injuring more. In
one incident, Christians were dragged from their homes and forced to covert; at least one
person, an 11-year old boy, was executed (Gregory 2012; Khan 2012).
Pakistani communities at large are indifferent to the plight of Hindus and Muslims
as minority groups and/or engage in harassment, discrimination, and violence towards
them; the claims of these non-Muslim groups are different from that of Shias and
Ahmedis, who face violence from militant groups who view their eradication as part of
their divine obligation. All of these groups are distasteful to a state apparatus that has its
stake to legitimacy premised on Pakistan as a Sunni state; thus, the state does not provide
them adequate protection from human rights abuses. Minority sects are in particular
danger as the militant groups that operate in Pakistan view them as infidels and heretics
that have no place in their world order. The Pakistani state’s feeble attempts to crack
down on extremism in the country following U.S. pressure after 9/11 were met with
resistance from the country’s religious establishment. Religious groups now had enough
power to punish those politicians that attempted to speak against their agenda –
Musharraf’s life was repeatedly under attack following his attempts to curb extremism
(Hussain 2004).
According to various International Crisis Group reports, these groups have all at
various junctions of Pakistani history have been the targets of persecution,
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discrimination, and often violent attack. They challenge the image of a country that
markets itself as an Islamic republic, and as a result face harassment. When any of these
groups become perceived threats to the position of the dominant Sunni majority, which
has its doctrines sanctified in state law, they become the targets of attacks by militant
groups. The main group subject to the latter are Shia Muslims. They are seen as an
affront to the status of Pakistan as an Islamic state, which creates an environment of
coercion, intimidation, powerlessness, and violence that members of these communities
are unable to curb. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
has reprimanded the Pakistani government for “engaging in or tolerating particularly
severe violations of religious freedom” (USCIRF 2003).
It is important to not lump the plight of religious communities with that of
Pakistan’s urban and rural poor. While Pakistan’s poor communities suffer poverty,
inadequate education, political corruption, insecurity, powerlessness, bondage, state
repression, intimidation, and occasionally violence as part of their regular lives, the
situation for Pakistan’s religious minorities is arguably worse because in addition to
many of them being poor, they are also subject to the difficulties that arise from being of
religious minority status.

Worsening Legal Contexts for Religious Minorities
Throughout Pakistan’s history, the legal protections for religious minorities have
become increasingly scant. Ambiguous national identity played a large role in defining
Pakistan’s initial decades, and the country’s first few leaders placed secularism over
religion while ruling the state. The first constitution in 1956 recognized freedom of
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religion, the right to refuse religious education, and the right to practice the religion of
one’s choice. The 1962 constitution contained similar secular ideals while effectively
proclaiming Pakistan to be an Islamic state in name. Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s second
president and first military dictator, did not heavily mix religion with politics, reflecting
the approach of the vast majority of Pakistanis at the time (Hussain 2007; Weiss 1986).
Pakistan’s 1973 constitution, established under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was the first
to officially declare Islam Pakistan’s state religion; however, it did contain some
important protections for religious minorities:

•

Article 20: freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions

•

Article 21: safeguards against the taxation of specific religions

•

Article 22: safeguards around education with respect to religious freedom

•

Article 25: equality of citizenship, and

•

Article 36: general protection of the rights of minorities, including giving
them access to political representation (Pakistan Constitution 1973).

This constitution seemed in keeping with the liberal ideals initially espoused by
Jinnah. However, it was radically changed in the late 1970s in accordance with Zia ulHaq’s Islamization process (Gregory 2012; Weiss 1986; Rashid 2008). Within the past
thirty years, Pakistan’s initial secularist, pluralist legal system gave way to a codification
of Islamic law that eradicated protections for the rights of religious minorities.
Developments of this nature in Pakistan’s legal history have included:

Haider 13
•

The establishment of shari’at benches in Pakistan’s high courts from 1979
onwards which have the authority to rule on whether any existing law is
‘repugnant to Islam’ and, if so, to amend it in accordance with Islamic principles;

•

The introduction of the 1979 Hudood ordinances which imposed harsh penalties
for offenses said to surpass the ‘boundaries’ set by God, which included drinking
alcohol, taking drugs, theft, sexual adultery and fornication;

•

The establishment of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat, or Law of Evidence, in 1984 which
reduced the weight of court testimony given by a Muslim woman and a nonMuslim male citizen to that of half a Muslim male citizen; many judges used the
law to justify the dismissal of non-Muslim witnesses entirely;

•

The provision of amendments in 1988 and 1991 that allowed for life
imprisonment for desecrating the Quran and the death penalty for offensive
remarks against the Prophet; and that made shari’a law, as established by the
Sunni religious parties, the supreme law in the country;

•

The 1998 Fifteenth Amendment that further emphasized the supremacy of
codified shari’a law, and also removed barriers to its enforcement and
implementation (Gregory 2012; Abbas 2002; Weiss 1986).

The important thing to note about these changes to an otherwise largely secular
constitution is that some of them were made after Zia’s death. In essence, the culture of
Islamization, and adherence to an exclusive identity of Islam, pervaded Pakistani political
and social institutions after his regime’s end and indeed continues to do so today. These
laws are testament to a socio-political environment that blatantly views religious
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minorities as unwanted, and as not belonging to the legitimatized state version of Sunni
Islam. The laws specified above contribute to a religiously intolerant environment that
allows for the functioning of religious and sectarian violence in Pakistan. This is further
exacerbated by religious minorities being essentially unequal under the law, with few
avenues for legal redress for the violation of their rights.

I. The Problem of Religious Violence
General Explanations
There is a broad and comprehensive literature on extremism in Pakistan – both
South Asian (Pakistani and Indian) as well as Western scholars have written extensively
on the subject, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. These scholars have
touched on a variety of issues ranging from violence by political parties to the Pakistani
military’s links with tribal warlords in league with militant groups. The literature written
on the subject of religious minorities has not been particularly extensive. Mostly,
literature on extremism in Pakistan focuses on three things: the role of Pakistani national
identity in hampering democracy and secularism in the country (Talbot 2009; Ollapolly
2008; Rashid 2008; Abbas 2002; Hussain 2007; M. Ahmed 1997; Cohen 2004); the
military’s standing as the foremost political institution in the country, as well as the rise
of the ISI in forming state domestic and foreign policy (Talbot 2009; Singh 2008; Fair
2008; Rashid 2008; Burki and Baxter 1991; Hussain 2007; Nawaz 2008; Haleem 2003);
and the general phenomenon of global jihad as it stemmed from the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan (Ollapolly 2008; Zahab and Roy 2009; Fair 2008; Rashid 2008; Abbas 2002;
Hussain 2007; Rana 2005; Devji 2005). There have been few pieces of literature linking
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all of these factors to explain intolerance against religious minorities, particularly as they
relate to specific, targeted violent attacks. This essay attempts to connect the three
explanations within the various literature on extremism in order to explicate the reasons
for violence against religious minorities.

National Identity
The theme of Pakistan’s national identity returns time and again in explanations
for Pakistan’s weak democratic institutions and its governments’ failures. Many scholars
have cited the ambiguity of national identity as the fundamental reason for the country’s
myriad problems, most of which they believe lie in violent Islam. The problem of
national identity has been conceptualized within the framework of Pakistani history, in
fact, to the movements that called for the creation of a separate state (Talbot 2009; Rashid
2008; Hussain 2007). The early movements promulgated by North Indian Muslims
eventually came to rely on using Islam as a unifying narrative – India’s Muslim
population was spread throughout the country among various ethno-linguistic groups, and
the founders of Pakistan ultimately used Islam as a vague starting point for the nation’s
purpose. Secular conceptualizations did not long last within the country’s political
movements, as they were often usurped by interests looking to consolidate and centralize
power (Hussain 2007; Cohen 2004; Abbas 2002). This meant that various actors,
including the state, could easily turn to an Islam that they legitimized and propagated in
order to gain power. Scholars have described an Establishment Islam, which arose as the
Muslim League moved to “Islamize” the state in response to Islamist forces and also
because of its own commitment to an Islamic state, rooted in rhetoric that touted Pakistan
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as a haven for the world’s Muslims. This early uncertainty has been put forth as the
reason for the state’s marriage to political Islam.
The Role of the Military
There has also been much written on the role of the Pakistani military in shaping a
great deal of the country’s institutions, including allowing militant groups to propagate
and fueling extremist agendas for its own needs. The military has been constantly
denounced for its dictatorial hold on the country’s politics; however, it has also been
heralded as the most secular institution in a state otherwise bogged by tribal politics and
religious fundamentalists (Hussain 2007). The military’s formative role in creating a
conservative, intolerant environment under the eleven-year regime of General Zia Ul-Haq
has been at least touched upon by nearly every scholarly source researched for this
subject – the General’s Islamization policy during the 1980s and its role in vitally
forming the rise of extremism in Pakistan cannot be downplayed (Talbot 2009; Ollapolly
2008; Singh 2008; Zahab and Roy 2009; Rashid 2008; Burki and Baxter 1991; Abbas
2002; Hussain 2007; Rana 2005; Nawaz 2008; M. Ahmed 1996; Gregory 2012; Haleem
2003; Shaikh 2008; Zaman 1998; Cohen 2004; ICG 2005).

Extremism in South Asia after the Soviet War
Finally, there is also a great deal of literature in relation to extremism in Pakistan
that cites the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the catalyst for religious militancy in the
country. The responses by the governments of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and
Pakistan resulted in a covert operation that radicalized, trained, and funded guerrilla
fighters in Afghanistan to resist the Soviets. These guerrillas would come to be known as
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the mujahideen, who would later evolve into the militant groups active in Pakistan and
Afghanistan today. Scholars point to these groups’ cooptation of their training during the
Afghan war to fight for their own versions of jihad, a struggle that includes attacks
against religious minorities and sects in Pakistan (Ollapolly 2008; Zahab and Roy 2009;
Fair 2008; Rashid 2008; Abbas 2002; Hussain 2007; Rana 2005; Devji 2005; Cohen
2004).

II. The Ambiguity of National Identity
The Creation of the Pakistani State
There is a large body of evidence testament to the fact that Mohammad Ali
Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father, conceptualized the country as a secular state. He
envisioned Pakistan to be a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims, rather than a theocracy
or as a state that was intolerant of other religions. When the Pakistan Constituent
Assembly elected Jinnah as their first president, he had the following to say about his
new state:
“If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no
matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the
past, no matter what is his color, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this
State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress
you will make… You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to
your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan… You may
belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the
State (A. Ahmed, 1997).”
This speech clearly establishes Jinnah’s stance on religious freedom – he believed
it to be a pillar on which the new state was to be formed. Jinnah perceived Pakistan to be
a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims, but certainly not one to the exclusion of any other
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religions. This vision did not come to pass, however; Pakistan’s tumultuous history
would lead to a state that had little room for religious minorities.
Despite Jinnah’s emphasis on a secular state, the Muslim League turned to
religion to unify the Indian subcontinent’s disparate ethnic and linguistic Muslim groups
(Talbot 2009; Cohen 2004; Khan 2012). It was through highlighting the threat of a
looming Hindu majority (an opposition to South Asian Muslims’ religious orientation)
that ultimately called for the creation of a separate state.
The motivation for the creation of Pakistan must be understood at some level as
communalism: for the Muslim League, national identity could and was premised on
religion. As the British sun set over India after World War II, elite Muslims in India’s
northern cities found the vaulting of Hindu concerns at a national level threatening. In
response, India’s Muslims began to discuss in university classrooms and coffee shops the
possibility of a nation separate from that of Hindustan, the “Land of the Hindus.”
However, the Muslim League’s concern of Muslims becoming a minority in what
they perceived to be an anti-Muslim nation did not achieve traction among broad sections
of the Indian Muslim populace. After the Muslim League’s poor showing in the 1937
elections, Jinnah turned to religious leaders to forward the League’s vision to Muslims,
and their support has often been cited as one of the primary reasons for the League’s
success in securing mass support for Pakistan (Talbot 2009; Rashid 2008).
Much of the support for the Muslim League came from Islamic scholars
collectively termed the ulama, composed of mullahs and pirs. While both mullahs and
pirs were eventually recruited to further the separatist cause, the distinction between the
two is highlighted by the differences in reaction they received from the masses. Mullahs
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functioned to study and spread orthodox Islamic thought. However, the stereotype of the
uneducated and hypocritical mullah had long been a trope in South Asian Muslim culture
(Talbot 2009, 29). Opposed to this negative portrayal of religion were the pirs, Sufi
mystics believed to have inherited baraka (religious charisma and sanction) from their
ancestors, who were locally known saints and martyrs. The pirs influence was based in
both morality and spirituality, against the mullahs’ mere regurgitation of Islamic law. The
popular appeal of the pirs imbued them with ethical and at times political authority. Their
recruitment in the Muslim League helped change the party’s fortunes and sanctified its
cause, as they led rallies and issued fatwas (religious declarations) in the forms of
newspapers, leaflets, and wall postings. Pirs personally made appeals to rural Muslims,
urging them to personally identify with the Pakistan cause as a Muslim cause. A leading
pir told his community followers at rallies in 1947 that “No question of someone’s caste
or conflicts of [brotherhood] should at this time come before you [in place of the Pakistan
cause] (Talbot 2009, 70).” The pirs thus placed religious identity over all others, with
little room for deviance from this standard.
This emphasis on religious identity overruled the secular conceptions of Pakistan
that were initially put forth by the Muslim League. The League’s leaders, and Jinnah in
particular, continued to emphasize up until the party’s collapse in the early 1950s that
while Pakistan was a safe haven for Muslims, the country would be secular in nature,
with no interference from religion in its governance or institutions. Some religious
clerics, when faced with this secular rhetoric, asserted that what Jinnah and the Muslim
League were doing was anti-Islamic – Jinnah and his colleagues brought Islam into the
realm of politics and nationalism, without basing the latter two ideas on Islamic law or
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institutions (Talbot 72, 2009). What Jinnah was proclaiming was a modernist Islamic
vision as yet unfathomable in the political soup that was South Asia during colonial
transition. He emphasized a secular Muslim nationhood devoid of conflict on the basis of
individual modes of expression and belief. To do this, he embarked on the two-pronged
strategy of convincing the international world as well as the Muslim masses that Pakistan
would be a secular state; at the same time, the pirs, in support of him, were rallying
people on the cry of an Islamic homeland. Instead of balancing these different identities
and visions, later generations of Pakistani leaders conflicted them.
Using Islam as the basis for national identity raised important questions: whose
Islam would be the state’s? What would be done about other Muslim sects? Could nonMuslims become citizens? How much of and what kind of Islamic law should be
incorporated into the country’s legal codes? These were not questions that were answered
in the early days of the republic – Pakistan’s founders remained ambiguous, stating that
the country would remain secular on certain levels, but without specificity or distinctive
boundaries between mosque and state (Hussain 2007; Cohen 2004; Abbas 2002). This
ultimately allowed leaders to design an Establishment Islam that was a conduit for their
own needs, and that also appeased Islamist insurgents among the country’s myriad
religious groups. This focal point in the country’s ideological creation has been the
reason why the state could not, did not, and often perpetuated narratives of national
identity that alienated the country’s minority religious groups.
Jinnah’s untimely death, as well as a lack of consensus on what a secular
homeland for Muslims would mean, created an ambivalent national identity. This identity
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would eventually be manipulated by the military-run state for its own agendas and would
have disastrous consequences for Pakistan’s religious minorities and sects.

III. The State’s Usage of Religious Conservatism
Since its inception, the Pakistani state has used religion as a political instrument.
The Muslim League’s play on Islam as a potential but vague unifying identity served the
purpose of bringing support for a state separate from India. This pattern of political
instrumentality has continued throughout Pakistan’s history, and has ultimately resulted
in the legal, political, and social legitimization of Sunni Deobandi3 Islam at the exclusion
of other religions. This environment has bolstered religious militancy, with attacks
against religious minorities increasing.
Even the secularist Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto utilized religion for his own political ends,
establishing links with the Deobandi Sunni religious schools (Hussain 2007; Weiss
1986). Many thought Bhutto’s ascendancy to leadership would finally herald social
democracy and strong secular institutions for Pakistan; he did indeed attempt to achieve
social and economic reforms, but sought to do so by funneling a nationalist Islamic
identity. He therefore courted religious parties, and upped the religious content in school
curricula in order to appease them. Under pressure from the religious parties, Bhutto
declared the Ahmedi sect as non-Muslim. What was perceived at the time to be an
apparently minor action increased religious zealotry and heightened intolerance against
religious minorities (Hussain 2007; Khan 2012; Abbas 2002).

3

A school of thought within Sunni Islam that advocates for societal reform through the imposition of
literalist shari’a law
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Islamization and its Consequences
The patronage of conservative religious parties reached new heights during the
reign of General Zia Ul-Haq. General Zia assumed power through a military coup on July
5, 1977, removing democratically elected Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. It was during this time that
Pakistan’s national identity became overtly premised on building an Islamic state in
function as well as name. In fact, Zia believed that the deposition of Bhutto had only been
possible because the Pakistani citizenry preferred an Islamic system to Bhutto’s
personalized and corporatist regime (M. Ahmad 1996; Talbot 2009). For Zia to unify the
disparate ethnic and political groups of Pakistan, he first had to definitively outline what
an Islamic state was. During this process, Pakistan’s history was rewritten, with “Jinnah
the secularist becoming Jinnah the upholder of Islam… while the ulama whose influence
had been marginal in the creation of Pakistan were elevated to a vanguard role” (Talbot
2009, 245). In this manner, Zia attempted to finally solve the problem of identity by
outlining ‘Muslim’ practices and codifying them in state law. Zia thus worked closely
with political Sunni groups such as the Jama’at-i-Islami (Islamic Party) and Jami’ayat-i‘Ulama-i-Islam (Party of the Scholar-Clerics of Islam) to institute religious reforms in
law that were hailed by religious conservatives, who viewed the solicitation of Islam in
official state policy as an affirmation of the religion’s place in public policy (M. Ahmad
1996; Talbot 2009; Rashid 2008).
The idea of Islam codified in state law was fully accepted by most Muslims, in a
country where morality was viewed through a religious lens. However, the idea naturally
met with competing claims about which version of Islam to institutionalize in law. Thus,
Islamic revivalism during the 1980s corresponded to the rise of sectarian divides, as Shias
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and Sunnis competed for political legitimacy. Ahmad writes, “With the revival of various
Islamic laws, the old juristic, doctrinal and theological differences among Muslim sects
and schools of law resurfaced with considerable intensity… The most serious conflict
arose over the question of which interpretation of Islamic law ought to be legislated into
public policy” (M. Ahmad 1996, 377). Although appearing on the surface to appease both
Shias and Sunnis, Zia in fact manipulated both groups to couch his regime in Islamic
legitimacy (Rana 2005). Initially, Zia’s regime met Shia demands for the inclusion of
their religious leaders in the incorporation of Islamic law into Pakistani law. However,
once the Shia minority had been appeased, Zia initiated a plan to divide the Shia
leadership, giving some Shia theologians places on state Islamic institutions, such as the
Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), the Federal Zakat Council, and the Majlis-i-Shura (M.
Ahmad 1996; Rana 2005). When riots continued to occur in Sunni reactions towards this
appeasement, and Shia militants responded, the government correctly assumed the
support of the Sunni majority, backed as it was by centralist and religious groups. These
groups successfully rallied to the government’s defense when any Shia threat appeared to
denounce the regime’s legitimacy, ultimately causing Zia’s Islamic government to be a
Sunni Muslim government (M. Ahmad 1996).
In his first televised speech to the nation, Zia proclaimed “Pakistan, which was
created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is
why I consider the introduction of an Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the
country” (Talbot 2009, 251). In this statement, Zia warned Pakistanis of the widespread
danger that would accrue by deviating from the official Islam that his regime would
espouse (Abbas 2002). In fact, the danger that Zia was attempting to avoid was a Pakistan
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that would continue to topple regimes because it could not agree on how to define itself.
However, his promulgation of religious unity would, ironically, exacerbate sectarian
divisions between Sunnis, Shias, and Sufis. By placing conservative Sunni Islam as the
religious, and therefore moral and ideological core of the country, Zia alienated religious
minorities and helped foment ambivalence towards their status as true Muslims, and true
participants in the nation-state (Singh 2008; Burki and Baxter 1991).
The laws that were passed under Zia’s regime, intended to promote an Islamic
understanding of law as espoused by Pakistan’s religious clerics, created a dearth of
human rights abuses in the country, and increased sectarian violence in major cities.
Whereas Sunni-Shia clashes had not been overly frequent before Zia took power, clashes
became more visible and more violent after 1977. Riots between the two groups killed 12
people in 1983, and more broke out in the fall of 1984 (Talbot 2009, 251). This sectarian
violence would increase rapidly over the coming decades, crippling Pakistan’s Shia
community. When religious clerics demanded that the Zikri community be declared nonMuslims because of their heterodox practices, despite their own affirmation as Muslims,
Zia side-stepped the issue and chose to ignore it, leading to discriminatory practices
against the Zikris (Nawaz 2008; Haleem 2003).
In a May 1982 speech, Zia declared that the “preservation of Pakistan ideology
and the Islamic character of the country was… as important as the security of the
country’s geographical boundaries” (Talbot 2009, 255). It is again important to
emphasize whose definitions of ‘Islamic character’ were being propounded and referred
to. Zia’s regime adhered to the mainstream Sunni religion; he sought to strengthen the
populace’s commitment to the state by requiring citizens to abide by conservative Islam.
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This had the critical effect of conflating citizens’ Pakistani and Muslim identities –
‘Pakistani’ no longer allowed for being ‘non-Muslim.’ Zia used religion to hold on to
power, and to cement the military’s legitimacy. While declaring himself to be fulfilling
the people’s will when overthrowing Bhutto, Zia halted elections in both 1977 and 1979
because, according to him, “the successful completion of the Islamization process was
much more important than the holding of elections” (M. Ahmad 1996, 375). Islamization
therefore usurped any secular understandings of the state – even democracy, purported to
be the defining basis for Pakistan, crumbled in the face of politicized religion. Zia utilized
religion to solidify his own power, leading him to be the longest-serving head of state of
Pakistan, ruling for over eleven years. Islamization led to a variety of problems that
continue to plague Pakistan today, including the government’s and military’s alliances
with extremist groups, as well as religious violence perpetuated against religious
minorities (Hussain 2007; Burki and Baxter 1991).
The problem of Islamization as a policy was articulated in the Pakistan Times in
1983: “When we say the country’s laws will be brought into conformity with the sunnah
[the example of the Prophet and the first two – or for some the first four – Caliphs] we
cannot put out any book acceptable to the community as a safe, secure and current
authority… So far the matter remains up to an individual’s faith it does not affect others
but when a faith is converted into a law, that will affect the Ummah (community) as a
whole” (Talbot 2009, 270). The author’s statement captured the essence of Islamization’s
final result – there were too many different types of Muslims in Pakistan for all to be
inclusively incorporated under one understanding. The end result of Islamization was the
touting of Sunni Islam as the correct Islam – deviations were blasphemous, and an affront
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to the country’s Islamic identity. By not being true Muslims, religious minorities were
not true Pakistanis.
Islamization alienated religious minorities through its emphasis on the punitive,
harsh, and conservative elements of Hanafi Sunni thought, instead of the egalitarian
economic and social mores pushed by progressive Islamic interpretations. A haphazard
Islamic judicial system was created in 1984 with the Qazi courts, judicial courts in which
cases could be assessed according to the Shari’a, or Islamic jurisprudence (Gregory
2012). Ulama with degrees from theological schools in Saudi Arabia were eligible for
appointment; these courts rarely ruled on the side of justice, overemphasizing arbitrary
rules like women’s prohibition from playing sports instead of focusing on police
corruption or Pakistan’s growing drug use problem (Talbot 2009, Rashid 2008). The
Hudood Ordinances passed in 1979 were envisioned to be practicing criminal justice
ordained through conservative interpretations of the Quran and Islamic law (Khan 2012;
Shaikh 2008; Singh 2008). Crimes subject to the harsh punishments of the Islamic Penal
Code included murder, adultery, perjury and intoxication (Zahab and Roy 2009). All of
these institutionalizations of conservative Sunni Islam served to normalize intolerant
ideas about religion, and also alienated religious minorities from public participation. As
a result of these policies Zia’s critics would eventually accuse him of “opening the
floodgates to the widespread ethnic and sectarian violence” (Talbot 2009, 247).
Zia’s Islamization came to systemize conservative Islamic elements of law and
order that had been prevalent in Pakistan since its inception. Zia and his advisors
frequently emphasized the now binding relationship between the ideological beginnings
of the state to the ideological bent of the government (M. Ahmad 1996; Haleem 2003;
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Shaikh 2008; Gregory 2012). Under Zia, Islam was used to legitimize and strengthen the
regime while at the same time downplaying and undermining secular forces. It also
brought in waves of support from religious political parties, whose large constituencies
were based in the religiously zealous, traditionally lower middle-classes of Punjab, Sindh,
and the Northwest Frontier Provinces (M. Ahmad 1996). Zia recognized these bases of
support, and catered to them by reemphasizing his commitment to the Islamic state both
through his policies and rhetoric – he promised to uphold the sanctity of the chador (the
veil) and the chardivari (the four walls of the house), representing female chastity and
purity and private property, values mirrored among the Sunni middle classes (M. Ahmed
1996; Burki and Baxter 1991; Rashid 2009).
Islam became the state’s primordial vehicle to assert itself to and respond to
challenges to its legitimacy. The state now had a Pakistani identity that would be difficult
to oppose: Pakistan had been created in response to a revived Islamic consciousness and
brotherhood among South Asian Muslims. In keeping with this tradition, the state had to
impose Islamic law in order to ensure the thriving of a pure and true Islamic state. This
placed minorities in an uneasy position – their Islam was not the one enforced by the
state, and thus their status as Pakistani citizens could be disputed. Non-Muslim minorities
had no such ambivalence placed on their status; Hindus, Sikhs, Ahmedis, and Christians
were certainly not Muslims, and their ideological wrongness translated to their exclusion
from full membership in the Pakistani polity. Islamization thus sowed the seed for
intolerance of religious minorities. Zia’s codification of Sunni Islam and his claim that it
created the foundation for Pakistan created a precarious situation for minorities that did
not conform to Sunni Islam.

Haider 28
Because of the state’s validation of Sunni Islam, allowing any other forms of
religion to propagate came to be viewed as a threat to its legitimacy. Acknowledging that
religion can mean different things to different people – in essence, allowing complete
freedom of religion – was and continues to be disquieting for the state and for its Sunni
majority. Allowing for freedom of religion would take away the state’s power to
prescribe the religious law of the land, a potent power in Pakistan (Zaman 1998).
The military has asserted its role in the country without much understanding of
civil governance. It has constantly intervened in democratic functions once military
generals begin to convince themselves that civilian leaders cannot lead the state without it
falling into chaos. The military’s interventions have always been touted as necessary for
the country’s well-being; however, they have continuously destroyed any foundation for
democracy and secularism. This pattern has continued over decades, with the military
retaining its hold on power by supporting, assisting, and utilizing religious parties (and
their fringe militant networks) to its own geopolitical advantage (Singh 2008; Burki and
Baxter 1991; Nawaz 2008). This exploitation has eroded secular institutions that could
provide safeguards for religious minorities.

The Rise of Militant Groups
It was during Zia’s reign that the Sipah-i-Sahaba emerged. Founded in 1985 in the
mid-sized city of Jhang in the Punjab, the organization agitated to have the Ahmedi sect
declared non-Muslim, and thus less protected by the mechanisms of a legally Sunni state
(Rana 2005; Zaman 2002; Rashid 2008). After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ceded to these
demands, the Sipah-i-Sahaba began to work against Shia Muslims, asserting that they too
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were non-Muslims. It began carrying out attacks against the community; at least some of
the funds given to the Sipah-e-Sahaba for these attacks were provided by the ISI and
other state agencies. The state suspected that Pakistani Shia organizations were being
provided monetary and weapons assistance by Shia Iran (Rana 2005). Thus, the Sipah-eSahaba was allowed to prosper under covert state auspices.
The Sipah-e-Sahaba is perhaps the most vocal and well-known Sunni group to
harass religious minorities, particularly Shia Muslims. Soon after its inception, the group
drafted a resolution that called for, among other things, the declaration of Pakistan as a
Sunni state, and that Shia speakers who speak contrary to orthodox tenets of Sunni
thought should be punished (Rana 2005; Nawaz 2008; Zaman 2002). The party became
enormously popular among large segments of the majority Sunni population. The
organization further called for an increase on Zia’s Islamization policies by turning seven
of Pakistan’s major cities into ‘model Islamic cities,’ which declared that shops close for
prayer; Friday be the weekly holiday; the prohibition of cable television; and that all
criminal cases be referred to religious scholars (Rana 2005, 198). With the patronage of
the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, the Sipah-e-Sahaba has become a prominent Sunni sectarian
group, encouraging the rise of similar groups such as Tahreek-e-Difa Sahaba and Tahafuz
Namoos-e-Rasul. The reach of the Sipah-e-Sahaba was so extensive that after the
September 11th attacks, as part of Pakistan’s initial policy to curb terrorism, Pakistan’s
Ministry of Interior sent a letter to the organization’s official headquarters informing
them of accusations being made against them by civil citizens. These included: that the
Sipah-e-Shaba was sponsoring fifty thousand men for militant training in Afghanistan; it
would bring these men back to Pakistan once their training was completed; the
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organization was planning on destroying Shia life and property; and that the group’s
leaders were making incendiary hate speeches against the Shia (Rana 2005; Zaman 1998;
Abbas 2002).
Following the lead of the Sipah-e-Sahaba, other militant Sunni organizations
began terrorizing Shia communities in Karachi and the NWFP in the late 1980s. These
included: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Jhangvi Tigers, Al Haq Tigers, the Al Badar Federation,
Al Farooq, Allah-o-Akbar, Sunni Tahreek, Saiful Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Ahle Sunnat,
Hizb-e-Azeemat, the Sunni Yakjehti Forum, the Ahle Hadees Youth Force, the
Shahaban-e-Ahle Hadees, Tehreek Difa Sihaba, Nawjawane-e-Tauheed Ahle Sunnat,
Jamiat Muhaibain-e-Sahaba and Idara Tahafuz-e-Namoos-e-Sahaba. All of these
organizations are spread throughout the country, and engage in sectarian and religious
violence. While there are Shia sectarian groups, they do not come close to the force and
power of Sunni militant groups, and have sprung up largely to defend themselves against
militant groups, not Sunni civilians (Rana 2005); in fact, the number of actively militant
Shia groups in the country total three.
The Sunni groups described above are situated within the dynamics, environment,
and agenda perpetuated by externally extremist groups who engage in violence against
perceived foreign foes such as India and the United States. In fact, the Sunni militant
groups often operate under the umbrella of larger jihadist groups. Groups go through the
same military training, attend the same sessions at madrassas, and even plan the same
attacks. Muhammad Amir Rana, a journalist researching militant organizations active in
Pakistan, was told by a member of the Sipah-e-Sahaba in an interview that: “While jihadi
organizations are fighting against infidels on our borders, we are putting an end to them
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in Pakistan. Both are jihad.” Most telling in this statement is the member’s identification
of religious minorities as the same infidels that must be fought on the border (Rana
2005).
Many of the demands made by Shia organizations are telling of the environment
in which this group lives. Tehreek-e-Jafferia, the only Shia organization in all of Pakistan
with a nationwide network, provided the Governor of Punjab in August of 2000 with a
list of demands that stated: Shia religious clerics should be allowed to appear on
television, Shia material should be included in the mandatory Islamics sections of school
curricula; Shias should be allowed basic housing; the ban on public Shia religious
processions should be lifted; Shia victims of sectarian violence should be provided
compensation; and terrorist groups targeting Shias should be banned from having close
relations with the state’s political apparatus (Rana 2005, 413). These demands include
access to basic human rights that are not given to Shias in the country, and are a result of
the environment of fear and violence this group lives in.

IV. The Shaping of Religious Militancy During the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Some scholars have claimed that militancy is not inherent to the schools of
religious thought within South Asia, and repeatedly emphasize there being few jihadbased attacks prior to Pakistan’s inception (Ollapolly 2008; Hussain 2007). Even when
religion was used to further political interests, militancy was not used domestically up
until Zia’s administration – rather, it was used to continue a proxy war in Kashmir as a
deterrent against India. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, a foundation
for domestic militancy was set in place that has become the cornerstone for attacks
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against religious minorities today. The Soviet invasion, occurring in tandem with Zia’s
Islamization of the country, was instrumental in creating a culture of religious militancy
that would dominate Pakistan for decades; this same culture would result in intense
increases of violence against religious minorities (Rana 2005).
The dominant Islamic religious schools of thought prevalent in South Asia –
Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-i-Hadith – have been conservative, sectarian, and even reformist,
but were never politically radical until the mid-1980s. It was during this period that
militant splinter groups began to form from these earlier religious movements. These
splinter groups are organized “within clandestine frameworks,” and it is thus difficult to
maintain how autonomous they are and what links they hold to their parent organizations
(Weiss 1986, 21). Their radicalization formed in response to two objectives that
eventually coalesced: the first was anti-Shi’ism, which evolved to include all religious
minorities, and the jihad in both Kashmir and Afghanistan. These objectives, during the
mid-1980s, came to encompass military training, the usage of armed struggle,
assassinations and targeted killings, and violent attacks against mosques and religious
institutions of other persuasions (Weiss 1986, 22).
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-Services
Intelligence, the military spy agency) under Zia Ul-Haq teamed up with the CIA to
launch a covert war against the Soviets. When the Soviets began building a military
presence in Afghanistan in 1979, Zia’s government established a direct link between
Saudi forces and the ISI; as a result, vast amounts of Saudi funds began flowing into
Pakistan that would in turn be used to strengthen the Afghan resistance against the USSR.
Later that same year, US president Jimmy Carter signed a classified memorandum
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providing similar support for the Afghan freedom fighters (Nawaz 2008; Talbot 2009).
The Reagan administration eventually funneled $2 billion worth of funds to the rebels
after 1980, matched by another $2 billion from Saudi Arabia, China, and other Gulf states
(Rashid 1988). Supported by these funds, the ISI trained guerrilla fighters in the rhetoric
of a jihadist ideology against the infidels invading from the north, establishing training
camps and madrassas that created a standing army against the Soviets. These fighters
came to be known as the mujahideen, literally ‘holy warriors.’ While backed by the ISI
and the CIA, the mujahideen eventually managed to turn the Soviets out of Afghanistan;
the legitimacy of a jihad against non-Muslims, both real and perceived, was now well on
its way. Pakistan’s state apparatus provided the most funding to the most extremist
groups, perpetuating a climate of violence and intolerance in the state (Talbot 2009).
Once the CIA pulled out of the covert operation in Afghanistan, the mujahideen veterans
were largely left to their own devices, and in the coming decades began to assert
themselves politically. These groups, while orchestrating continuing militancy campaigns
in Afghanistan and Kashmir, also sprawled domestically creating sectarian violence and
generally conducting hate campaigns against religious minorities.
Pakistani religious parties during the Afghan civil war provided volunteers to
fight for that country’s jihad; training camps were established along the Pakistani-Afghan
border to provide religious ideological and military training for would-be combatants.
After the Soviet war, Pakistan provided fertile ground for new jihadist enterprises,
particularly against India and towards internal threats within Pakistan, including religious
minorities as well as pro-Western politicians (Rana 2005; Rashid 2008). The proliferation
of militants previously engaged in Afghanistan into Pakistan was the result of the residual
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rhetoric of Zia’s Islamization process, which gave these organizations a legitimacy
centered on operating from a country that touted Islam as its state ideology (Rana 2005,
8).

Madrassas
The evolution of madrassas from informal school to radically ideological centers
during the Soviet War cannot be downplayed. Madrassas have been traditional centers of
learning across South Asia, drawing students into both formal and informal school
settings. As a result of Zia’s Islamization process, and the religious radicalism which
pervaded South and Central Asia during the Soviet War, madrassas took on a militant
bent, encouraging students to sacrifice themselves for their faith. These madrassas
overwhelmingly preached the same Sunni ideology promulgated by Zia – their jihad was
premised entirely on saving Islam from both Western and domestic infidels. Zia’s
Islamization process imposed Islamic taxes, zakat and khums, on the general population
which it then used to fund madrassas (Fair 2008; Abbas 2002).
Many of these madrassas were also funded by Sunni-dominant states including
Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which viewed the rise of a Shia Iran as a threat to their interests.
They thus funneled funds to spearhead and arm Pakistani Sunni groups – Saudi Arabia
particularly ensured that its money would be used to propagate its own Wahhabist
movement, a highly conservative branch of Islam that espoused intolerance of all nonMuslims (Fair 2008). The aftermath of the Afghan war even helped propagate the actual
number of religious parties in Pakistan. In 1979, there were 30 religious parties; today,
there are close to 376 (Rana 2005). This increase was due in part to the simultaneous
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increase in madrassas, which encouraged the political use of Islam. From 1979 to 1990,
there was a 100% increase in the number of militant religious organizations. The rapidity
with which all these institutions spread had a significant impact in the radicalization of
young men across the country. Many of those attending Sunni madrassas would
eventually be shipped off to militant organizations conducting attacks in Kashmir, India,
and Afghanistan, and also within Pakistan against religious and sectarian minorities (Fair
2008, Rana 2005).
Most scholars agree that these madrassas were not satisfactory educational
institutions (Fair 2008; Abbas 2002; Rashid 2008; Zaman 2002; Hussain 2007); they
catered to the sectarian bent they were built on, and created impediments to modern
knowledge and creativity. Madrassas fueled hate and discontent towards their rival
sectarian groups, and posited them as infidels. The advent of jihad culture in the 1980s
led to the burgeoning of madrassas. There were only 137 in Pakistan at the time of the
independence, and were general institutions of learning; during and after Islamization,
they doubled every year, with current estimates figuring at 13,000 with an enrollment of
1.7 million students between five and eighteen years old (Hussain 2007). While
madrassas did not train students in arms or provide them with weapons, they heavily
encouraged them to join religious holy wars happening in the country, in Kashmir, and in
Afghanistan; they also indoctrinated them with an ideological mindset predicated on
fulfilling jihad.
Since the cultural and religious avalanches of the 1980s, madrassas have become
increasingly sectarian – they teach students with an intent to instill in them the
ideological biases of the schools of thought they represent. Thus, a Sunni Wahhabist
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madrassa will inculcate in its students an understanding of Shias and Ahmedis as heretics
blaspheming the name of Islam, and non-Muslims as either enemies or those in need of
conversion. These madrassas portray an image of a ‘good’ Muslim as one who will
spread God’s message at whatever cost to himself or others, encouraging students to join
militant organizations as their religious and moral obligation (Fair 2008).

Conclusion
The environment of religious intolerance has been due to a number of factors. The
lack of consensus on a national identity that made vague allusions to an Islamic identity
was not initially coopted by military leaders; however, in later decades, the military used
an Islamic rhetoric to justify its foreign and domestic policies, as well as its hold on
national power. In the process, the military relied on religious parties and groups to
purport the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state – Islam’s place as the state religion would
mean that the military would have total control over how Pakistan would be defined; it
could then make the state’s enemies Islam’s enemies. The rhetorical and moral power of
religion could now be exploited for the military’s own political interests. This
development was most fully visible in the 1980s during the regime of General Zia UlHaq, who instituted a program of Islamization that instituted harsh penalties for speaking
against conservative Sunni Islam, and that indoctrinated the country’s social and political
institutions with a rabid conservative exclusion. It was due to this usage of Sunni Islam as
the country’s moral and legal framework that Ahmedis were declared to be a non-Muslim
group; it also resulted in intolerance and violence against non-Muslim faiths in Pakistan,
including Hindus and Christians. The interference of the ISI, the CIA, and the Saudi
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government during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to the rise of Islamic militancy
in South Asia. Militant groups that are offshoots of this initial movement remain active in
Pakistan, conducting attacks on religious minorities throughout the country. Shia
Muslims have been subject to the most brutal violence in the nation, with daily killings of
known Shias, as well as brutal massacres of entire communities.
At least part of the reason for the continuing intolerance against religious
minorities is due to the state’s inability and/or refusal to forcefully strike down on
militants. After Pakistan aligned itself with the US in the War on Terror, the Musharraf
administration promised to eradicate extremism and sectarianism from Pakistan.
However, these efforts have been halfhearted and unsuccessful – Pakistan was unable to
curb the hate speech spreading from madrassas and militant organizations with large,
public platforms, and attacks against religious minorities have continued as a result.
The plight of religious minorities in Pakistan should be a pressing problem for the
country; however, the state has done little to nothing to prevent the attacks and
discrimination occurring against them. International pressure could be more effective in
forcing the state to confront its extremist problem, as well as to place mechanisms in its
legal apparatus that would provide adequate protection for religious minorities, rout out
fundamentalist groups, and give minorities full-fledged citizenship regardless of religious
affiliation. Until the Pakistani state works to sufficiently eradicate militants from
Pakistan’s terrain and emphasizes freedom of religion as inherent to Pakistan’s identity,
the situation for Pakistan’s religious minorities will remain bleak.
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